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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

KEITH W. BOURGEOUS
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:
:

Case No. 981518-CA

v.

:

District Court No. 98-0900810

UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE

:

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant, Keith W. Bourgeous, appeals from an order of Third Judicial District
Court Judge Ronald E. Nehring, dismissing his complaint for judicial review of a
informal administrative action for lack ofjurisdiction based upon its untimely filing. The
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(a)(1996).

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Department of Commerce disagrees with Appellant's statement of issues in
his brief, and therefore it submits the following statement of issues, followed by the
applicable standard of review:
1. Does the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, specifically UUih Code Ann. §
63-46b-13 (1988), preclude Agency Reconsideration in cases in which Agency Review
was available? If so, was Agency Review available to the appellant? Standard of
Review: The trial court's interpretation of statutes and rules is a question of law reviewed
for correctness. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). Likewise, legislative
intent is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Mitchell. 824 P.2d 469, 47172(UtahApp. 1991).
2. Is the Department of Commerce estopped from raising the issue of the
timeliness of the Appellant's complaint for judicial review based upon a notice of appeal
rights contained in an order entered after Appellant's time period to seek judicial review
had already expired? Standard of Review: The application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel is a mixed question of law and fact. The examination and interpretation of the
common law legal standard is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v.
Jenkins. 840 P.2d 877, 778-79 (Utah 1992). The issue of whether Appellant relied upon
the representation to his detriment is a question of fact and therefore reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993).
2

3. Even if Agency Reconsideration was authorized by law, was the Appellant's
request, coming more than 20 days after the Department's Order on Review, timely? If
not, was the subsequent complaint for judicial review timely? Standard of Review: The
trial court's interpretation of statutes and rules is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 2, 1997, Keith W. Bourgeous applied with the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the Department of Commerce for licensure as
a Professional Engineer. The application was denied by the Division in an informal
administrative action on September 24, 1997 for "failure to document graduation from the
required EAC/ABET accredited program in engineering." (Addendum 1). Bourgeous
requested Agency Review on October 21, 1997. (Addendum 2). An order on Agency
Review was entered October 24, 1997, denying his request for Agency Review based
upon his failure to comply with the rules governing Agency Review, and advising him of
his right to seek judicial review within 30 days. (Addendum 3). Bourgeous requested the
Agency Review be reopened on October 30, 1997. (Addendum 4). On November 4,
1997, the Division denied this request for failure to state a basis upon which the request
could be granted and again advised Bourgeous of his right to seek judicial review within
30 days. (Addendum 5). Bourgeous again petitioned the Department, this time on
3

November 21,1997, for Agency Reconsideration. (Addendum 6). The Division denied
this request on December 29, 1997, holding that Agency Reconsideration is statutorily
precluded because Agency Review was available. (Addendum 7). On January 23, 1998,
Bourgeous filed a complaint with the Third District Court seeking judicial review of the
denial of licensure. (Addendum 8). Judge Ronald E. Nehring dismissed Bourgeous'
complaint on July 22, 1998, for lack of jurisdiction because the complaint wasfiledlate.
(Addendum 9). Bourgeous filed his notice of appeal to this court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 2, 1997, Appellant (hereafter "Bourgeous") applied with the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing (Division) of the Department of
Commerce (Department) for licensure as a professional engineer. The application for
licensure was denied by the Division on September 24, 1997 for "failure to document
graduation from the required EAC/ABET accredited program in engineering."
(Addendum 1).
On October 21, 1997, Bourgeous requested Agency Review with the Department
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1997) . (Addendum 2). On October 24,1997,
the Department issued its Order on Review denying Bourgeous9 request for relief from
the Division's denial of licensure for failing to comply with the rules governing Agency
4

Review. (Addendum 3). Contrary to Bourgeous' assertions to the trial court and now to
this Court, the Order on Review complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §6346b-12(6)(c) (1997). The Order clearly dismissed Bourgeous' Request for Agency
Review, and it informed Bourgeous of his right to seek judicial review and the time frame
from which appeal must be taken. (The complete "Order on Review" is attached as
Addendum 3).
Although the Order on Review advised Bourgeous he could seek judicial review of
the order within 30 days, he elected to file a unique request with the Department on
October 30, 1997 to reopen Agency Review for consideration of information he failed to
provide in the original request. (Addendum 4). The Department issued another order on
November 4, 1997, denying Bourgeous' request to reopen Agency Review on the grounds
he failed to state a basis upon which the request could be granted. This Order again
informed Bourgeous of his right to seek judicial review within 30 days. (Addendum 5).
Ignoring the two previous notices that he may seek judicial review, Bourgeous
next petitioned the Department on November 21, 1997, for Agency Reconsideration,
ostensibly pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1997) and Utah Admin. Code §
Rl 51 -46b-13(1997). (Addendum 6). The Department dismissed the request for Agency
Reconsideration on December 29, 1997 for lack ofjurisdiction, noting that Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1997) and Utah Admin. Code § R151-46b-13 (1997) expressly
preclude Agency Reconsideration where Agency Review is available. (Addendum 7).
5

The Department found that Agency Review was available, that Bourgeous availed
himself of Agency Review concerning the license denial (as evidenced by his October 21,
1997 request for Agency Review and the Department's October 24, 1997 Order on
Review), and therefore Agency Reconsideration was expressly precluded. (Id.)
On January 23, 1998, Bourgeous filed an action in the Third Judicial District Court
for judicial review challenging the merits of the Division's September 24, 1997 decision
to deny his license application. (Addendum 8). Bourgeous' complaint did not challenge
the Department's December 29, 1997 denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, nor the
Department's November 4, 1997 refusal to reopen agency review. (Id.). On July 22,
1998, Judge Ronald E. Nehring dismissed Bourgeous' complaint, ruling:
Plaintiffs election to seek agency reconsideration does not act to toll
the 30 day period in which he was required to file for judicial review in the
district court since he had no right to seek reconsideration . . . . Plaintiffs
Complaint requesting judicial review was filed on January 23, 1998, more
than 30 days beyond the Department's [October 24, 1997] Order on
Review. Accordingly, the Complaint was filed untimely and the Court is
without jurisdiction to consider the matter.
(Addendum 9).
Bourgeous filed his notice of appeal to this Court on August 19, 1998.

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
1. Agency reconsideration is expressly precluded where agency review is
available. The legislative history of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act makes it
clear that if agency review of the Department's order was available in the first instance,
agency reconsideration is precluded. The interpretation of "unavailable" urged by
Bourgeous, i.e., that "unavailable" includes "exhausted," is specious logic without
support in case law and inconsistent with legislative history. The order on review was not
defective or inadequate in any manner. It clearly notified Bourgeous of his right to
judicially appeal within 30 days, yet he chose to file two more attempts at administrative
review, neither of which were authorized by statute or rule. He thereafter filed a
complaint for judicial review which was properly dismissed by the District Court for lack
of jurisdiction because it was filed more than 30 days after the entry of the order on
review, the final agency action.
2. Equitable estoppel is legally and factually inapplicable. Bourgeous could not
have possibly relied to his detriment on the appeal notice contained in the December 29,
1997 order dismissing his unauthorized fequest for reconsideration, because it was issued
more than a month after his right to judicial review expired. Bourgeous was advised in
the Department's October 24, 1997 order on review of his right to judicial review within
30 days and he chose to disregard the notice, instead filing a request to reopen review, not
provided for in law, and a request for reconsideration, expressly precluded under these
7

circumstances by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The Department fulfilled its
obligation to notify Bourgeous of his right to judicial appeal in its order on review, and it
had no obligation to respond to his request for reconsideration.
3. Assuming, arguendo, Bourgeous had a right to reconsideration, his request for
reconsideration was untimely, making his request for judicial review untimely. In
circumstances in which reconsideration is appropriate, the request must be made within
20 days of entry of the final agency action. Although Bourgeous' request was made
within 20 days of the order responding to his novel request to reopen review, that request
was without basis in statute or rule and the resulting order dismissed the request for
failure to state a basis for the request. He cannot toll the time period for filing the request
for reconsideration by filing an intervening, improper request. Bourgeous' request for
reconsideration was filed November 21, 1997, more than 20 days after the Department's
October 24, 1997 order on review.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT EXPRESSLY
PROVIDES FOR AGENCY RECONSIDERATION ONLY WHERE AGENCY
REVIEW IS UNAVAILABLE. AGENCY REVIEW REGARDING THE DIVISION'S
DECISION WAS NOT ONLY AVAILABLE, BOURGEOUS AVAILED HIMSELF OF
IT.
The denial of an application for licensure by the Division of Occupational and

8

Professional Licensing is classified as an "informal adjudicative proceeding"1 under the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act2. "Agency Review," as defined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-12, is available through the Department of Commerce to any aggrieved party
seeking relief from an informal adjudicative action, such as licensure denial, by simply
filing a request for Agency Review within 30 days after the issuance of the order to be
challenged.3

The Department is required by both statute and rule to issue a written

"Order on Review" responding to the issues and claims for relief raised in the request for
Agency Review.4

The Order on Review constitutes final agency action5 for purposes of

the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies found in the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act.6 A party may seek de novo judicial review of a final agency action in
the District Court after exhausting all available administrative remedies.7 The "party
shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after the date

1
2

Utah Admin. Code § R156-46b-202(l)(e) (1997).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-0.5 (1997) et seq.

3

Utah Admin. Code § R151-46b-12 (1997).

4

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(6) (1997) and Utah Admin. Code § Rl 51-46b-12(9)

(1997).
5

Utah Admin. Code § Rl 51-46b-14(2) (1997).

6

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (1997).

7

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1997).
9

that the order constituting final agency action is issued. ..."

(Emphasis added).8

By the express terms of its definition, "Agency Reconsideration" is not available
to challenge an order resulting from Agency Review. An aggrieved party may request
Agency Reconsideration "[w]ithin 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 [Agency Review]
is unavailable...."

(Emphasis added).9 In other words, Agency Reconsideration is not

available where Agency Review is.
Moreover, the only example of Agency Reconsideration found in the Department's
administrative rules is in cases where the aggrieved party is challenging an order or
decision entered by the Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification Board.10
Because Agency Review is not available as to any order or decision entered by that
Board,11 Agency Reconsideration is the form of administrative appeal.

With the

exception of the decisions of that one board, Agency Review is the exclusive
administrative remedy available to challenge licensure denials before any other
professional licensing Board of the Department of Commerce.12 As such, with the

8

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1997).

9

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a) (1997).

10

Utah Admin. Code § R151-46b-13(l)(a) (1997).

11

Utah Admin. Code § Rl 51-46b-12(2) (1997).

12

Utah Admin. Code §§ R151-46b-12 (1997) and R151-46b-13(l)(a) (1997).
10

exception noted above, Agency Review will always constitute the final agency action
from which a petition for judicial review must follow within 30 days of issuance of an
Order on Review in order to preserve the appeal.
"The fundamental and initial inquiry of a court is always to determine its own
jurisdictional authority over the subject matter of the claims asserted. Upon a
determination by the court that its jurisdiction is lacking, its authority extends no further
than to dismiss the action." Thompson v. Jackson. 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). Without the proper filing of a petition for judicial review within 30 days of an
agency's final agency action under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1997) and 63-46b-15 (1997)), the court is without jurisdiction
to consider the appeal. (Emphasis added). Silva v. Dept. of Employment Security. 786
P.2d 246, 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Bourgeous was clearly instructed in the October 24, 1997 Order on Review that an
appeal of the decision must be directed to the District Court for judicial review.13 He
disregarded that instruction and instead elected to file two successive requests for

13

Bourgeous claims that the Order on Review was defective in that it failed to comply
with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(6)(c) (1997). Specifically, he claims that
the order does not contain conclusions of law, notice of further administrative or judicial review
rights, notice of applicable time limits for appeal, and a statement as to whether the underlying
decision was affirmed or reversed. In support of his assertion, he provided this Court with the
first and third pages of a four page order. Pages 2 and 4 are omitted. See Appellants "Exhibit
D." The complete four page order sent to Bourgeous by the division contains conclusions of law,
notice of further administrative or judicial review rights, notice of applicable time limits for
appeal, and a statement dismissing the request for agency review. (See Addendum 3).
11

administrative relief, neither of which was authorized in statute or rule. The Order on
Review issued October 24, 1997 was the Department's final agency action from which
Bourgeous could judicially challenge the merits of the license denial. The complaint for
judicial review sought judicial review and relief from the denial of Bourgeous'
application for licensure as a professional engineer. However, his appeal rights
extinguished on November 23, 1997, 30 days after the final agency action (the October
24, 1997 order based upon Agency Review).14 Given Bourgeous' untimely filing of his
petition for judicial review, the District Court properly ruled that it was without
jurisdiction to consider the matter. Silva v. Dept. of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246,
247 (Utah App. 1990).
Neither the Utah Administrative Procedures Act nor the Utah Administrative Code
permit Bourgeous to file more than one request for Agency Review or to petition for
Agency Reconsideration after receiving Agency Review. His request to reopen Agency
Review and subsequent petition for Agency Reconsideration cannot be used to create a
string of agency orders from which appeals are taken so as to preserve or resurrect an
otherwise extinguished right to judicial review in the District Court. Endorsing such a

14

In dismissing Bourgeous' complaint, the District Court ruled that the November 4,
1997 order, which Judge Nehring called the "order on review," was the Final Agency Action,
from which Bourgeous had 30 days to judicially appeal. The Division's position is that the
October 24,1997 order on review was the Final Agency Action from which to appeal. However,
from whichever order is deemed the "Final Agency Action," Bourgeous' judicial complaint filed
January 23, 1998 was untimely.
12

procedure would allow litigants to receive administrative review after review, each
challenging the outcome of the preceding review. This process could theoretically
perpetuate itself indefinitely, thus eliminating any finality to the administrative action.
In a similar administrative case arising from the Industrial Commission, the Utah
Court of Appeals concluded that a claimant's successive requests for administrative
review which were not permitted by statute would not toll the statutorily prescribed time
for appeal. Ring v. Industrial Commission, Second Fund. 744 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).15 In Ring the claimant exercised his right to request administrative review
challenging the decision of a Commission administrative law judge. Following issuance
of the order denying review, the claimant filed a "Motion for Review Supplement," not
permitted by statute, which was also denied. He then filed a petition for judicial review
within 30 days of the order denying an unauthorized motion but beyond 30 days of the
order denying the authorized motion for Agency Review. The Court concluded that the
order denying Agency Review (and not the order resulting from the subsequent novel,
unauthorized motion) was the operative order from which to appeal judicially within 30
days. It did not matter whether the unauthorized motion was seen as merely an attempt to

15

The reasoning in Ring v. Industrial Commission. Second Fund is presented as
persuasive argument and not as binding precedent. Appellee recognizes that the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act was enacted in 1987, one year after the administrative ruling at
issue in the Ring decision. Nonetheless, the reasoning of the court is directly on point, and
consistent with the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
13

supplement the authorized review:
[I]n filing a motion for review
a claimant has an obligation to
raise all issues that can be presented at that time. Those issues which are
not raised are waived. Accordingly, the filing of material which purports to
"supplement" a motion does not act to revive the motion after is has been
denied by the adjudicating tribunal. (Citations omitted).16
The court dismissed the petition for judicial review concluding that "[fjurther
consideration or action by the Commission which is not permitted by statute will not toll
the statutorily prescribed time for appeal."17

The court further reasoned:

Present statutory provisions regarding worker's compensation jurisdiction
do not allow for subsequent motions to the Commission for review once it
has disposed of the case on the merits.
Accordingly, the filing of material which purports to "supplement" a
motion does not act to revive that motion after it has been denied by the
adjudicating tribunal.
Petitioner is entitled to "one bite of the apple" on review.... That
opportunity cannot be expanded into a multi-course buffet by such devices
as re-considerations or supplemental filings after a motion for review has
been denied by the Commission, (citations omitted).18

Bourgeous urges this Court to adopt a different interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-13 (1997). He asserts that the headings prefacing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12
(1997) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1997) supercede the clear language of § 63-

16
17

18

744 P.2d 602 at 603.
&

Id. at 603-604.
14

46b-13 (1997) limiting agency reconsideration to cases where agency review is
unavailable. He urges that Agency Review is "unavailable" for purposes of Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1997), if it has been used and exhausted. Bourgeous' argument is
specious. The requirement of unavailability relates to Agency Review, and the subject
matter reviewed during Agency Review is the Division's order denying licensure. The
requirement of unavailability of Agency Review therefore relates to the review of the
merits of the Division's order denying Bourgeous licensure.
Legislative history dispels any doubt concerning this point. In 1987 the
Administrative Procedures Act was enacted and § 63-46b-13 of the original act explicitly
authorized agency reconsideration, even in cases in which agency review was previously
sought and received. The Administrative Procedures Act, as originally enacted, provided:
Within ten days after the date that an order on review is issued, or
within ten days after the date that a final order is issuedfor which agency
review is unavailable, any party may file a request for reconsideration,
stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested.... (Emphasis
added).
1987 Laws of Utah, Chapter 161, Section 269 (§ 63-46b-13(l)). (Addendum 10). The
Legislature amended the section in 1988 to read as it is currently found in the
Administrative Procedures Act, limiting reconsideration to instances where agency
review is unavailable.19 (Addendum 11) The fact that the legislature originally chose to
19

"Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review by the agency or
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise
constitute final agency action, any party may file a request for reconsideration with the agency,
15

expressly provide for Agency Reconsideration after either Agency Review or "after the
date that a final order is issued for which agency review is unavailable" clearly
demonstrates legislative intent that the "unavailable" agency review means unavailable in
the first instance. If "unavailable" agency review included instances where agency
review had been utilized and exhausted, as Bourgeous urges, the first clause would be
redundant of the second.

When the legislature chose to amend the section in 1988 to

eliminate agency reconsideration "[w]ithin ten days after the date that an order on review
is issued," they clearly evidenced a desire to make agency reconsideration available only
when agency review was unavailable in the first instance. Any other interpretation of the
language of the statute would render the legislature's 1988 amendment meaningless.
Because Agency Review of the Division's order denying Bourgeous licensure was
available, Bouregous' request for reconsideration was appropriately dismissed by the
Department for lack of jurisdiction and it cannot now be used to extend the previously
expired deadline for seeking judicial review.
Bourgeous9 reliance on dicta in a footnote in Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial
Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993) is misplaced. This Court was not called
upon, and therefore did not consider, the issue of whether the Agency Reconsideration
was appropriate in its holding or in dicta. The issue addressed in footnote 11 in

stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested." 1988 Laws of Utah, Chapter 72,
Section 23 (§ 63-46b-13(l)(a)). (See Addendum 11).
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Maverick Country Stores20 was whether a party, otherwise entitled to reconsideration,
could simultaneously file a motion for Agency Reconsideration and appeal to the courts.21
This issue is different from a consideration of whether Agency Reconsideration is
authorized at all. Much more to the point is footnote 9 in Maverick Country Stores not
cited by Bourgeous:
As our supreme court has noted in a different setting, if we allow a
second motion for reconsideration or "re-reconsideration" what is to
prevent another motion for re-re-reconsideration? Tenacious litigants and
lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures and theoretically
[this could go on] ad infinitum.
Maverick Country Stores, 860 P.2d 944 at 951, n. 9 (Citations omitted). The duplication
of administrative reviews that concerned this Court in Maverick Country Stores was also
the concern of the legislature when it amended the Utah Administrative Procedures Act to
eliminate Agency Reconsideration when Agency Review is available.
Bourgeous cites, but does not discuss, a plethora of Utah appellate court cases for
the proposition that, "Utah Courts have repeatedly reviewed, under a de novo standard,
petitions from agency denials of requests for reconsideration of an earlier final agency

20

860P.2dat951.

21

This Court stated,"[ §63-46b-13] provides a petitioner with the option of applying to
the agency for reconsideration or appealing to the courts. It does not provide petitioner the
opportunity to pursue both routes concurrently
"
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action or 'Agency Review9".22 None of the cases cited by Bourgeous are on point.
Although each of the cases is an appeal originating from an administrative order on
agency reconsideration, none of those cases address, directly or in dicta, the issue of
whether § 63-46b-l3 permits reconsideration where agency review of the merits of the
order is available. The cases discuss procedural issues, especially issues relating to the
date upon which the judicial review filing deadline begins to run from a legitimate request
for reconsideration. They do not, however, support Bourgeous' contention that he was
entitled to agency reconsideration in this case or that his petition for judicial review is
timely.
In only one case cited by Bourgeous did the appellant received both review and
reconsideration: 49TH Street Galleria v. Tax Commission.23 However, that case is
distinguishable from the case a bar because the Tax Commission has chosen to establish,

22

Evans & Sutherland v. Tax Commission. 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997); Nelson v. Board
of Equalization of Salt Lake County. 943 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997); Newspaper Agency Corp. v.
Auditing Div. Of Utah State Tax Com'n.. 938 P.2d 266 (Utah 1997); Visitor Information Center
Authority of Grand County v. Customer Service Div.. Utah State Tax Com'n.. 930 P.2d 1196
(Utah 1997); Career Service Review Board v. Department of Corrections. 942 P.2d 933 (Utah
1997); Utah Association of Counties v. Tax Com'n. Of the State of Utah ex rel. MCI
Telecommunications Corp.. 895 P.2d 825 (Utah 1995); Harper Investments v. Auditing Division.
868 P.2d 813 (Utah 1994); Harrington v. Industrial Commission. 942 P.2d 961 (Utah App.
1997); Lunnen v. Utah Department of Transportation. 886 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1994); Orton v.
Utah State Tax Commission. Collection Division. 864 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1994); Knowledge
Data systems v. Tax Commission. 865 P.2d 1387 (Utah App. 1993); 49th Street Galleria v. Tax
Commission. 860 P.2d 996 (Utah App. 1993); Parkdale Care Center v. Frandsen. 837 P.2d 989
(Utah App. 1992).
23

860 P.2d 996 (Utah App. 1993).
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through its rule making authority, a procedure by which every order prepared by a
presiding officer is automatically reviewed by the Agency before a Final Agency order is
entered.24 This automatic review is not the same as the Agency Review contemplated by
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1997). The automatic review by the Tax Commission is a
review by the Commission of the findings, conclusions, and order prepared by the
presiding officer, a designated employee who serves as a hearing officer. Conversely, the
Agency Review contemplated in § 63-46b-12 (1997) is a post-order review by a superior
agency of an order issued by an inferior agency.25 The review done by the tax
commission is further distinguishable because it is automatic without request; it is not an
elective by either party. Conversely, the review contemplated in § 63-46b-12 (1997) is
not automatic, it requires that a request be made within 30 days of entry of the order. The
only elective administrative appeal in Tax Commission decisions is Agency

24

Utah Admin. Code § R861-1A-29. Agency Review and Reconsideration Pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-13.
A. Agency Review.
1. All written decisions and orders shall be submitted by the presiding officer to
the commission for agency review before the decision or order is issued. Agency Review is
automatic, and no petition is required.
B. Reconsideration. Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued, any
party may file a written request for reconsideration alleging mistake of law or fact, or alleging
new evidence.
25

Agency Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 is distinguishable from
Agency Reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 because Agency Review is a
review of an order of an inferior agency by a superior agency, while Agency Reconsideration is a
reconsideration of an order by the same agency issuing the order.
19

Reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1997).26 Because the Tax
Commission has chosen to establish a unique procedure through its rule making authority,
with both automatic review before orders are entered and elective Agency
Reconsideration within 20 days after an order is entered, the existence of both prior
review of orders by the Tax Commission and Agency Reconsideration in 49th Street
Galleria does not support Bourgeous9 position that he is entitled to both post-order
Agency Review as contemplated by §63-46b-12 and Agency Reconsideration as
contemplated by §63-46b-13.
Bourgeous further argues in the alternative that the Department's action of issuing
its December 29, 1997 order in response to his request for reconsideration validated the
request, thus extending the filing deadline for judicial review. He cites 49th Street
Galleria in support of this position. However, 49th Street Galleria holds that the 30-day
period for seeking judicial review begins to run on the date the request for reconsideration
is deemed denied unless an order is issued, in which case the date of the order is the
operative date. The holding was limited to the "deemed denied" provisions of § 63-46b13(3)(b) (1997), which states that a request for reconsideration is deemed denied if not
responded to by the agency within 20 days of filing. Because the Tax Commission
provided by rule for automatic Commission review of orders of the presiding officer
before entry of the order, followed by a right to elective Agency Reconsideration, there
26

Supra, note 24.
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was no issue as to the propriety of the Agency Reconsideration in 49th Street Galleria.
Nowhere in 49th Street Galleria is it held or suggested that an agency's response to a
statutorily precluded request for reconsideration validates it and revives an otherwise
expired opportunity for judicial review. Moreover, the Department did not address the
merits of Bourgeous' request for reconsideration. The request was summarily denied
because reconsideration was statutorily precluded and the Department thus lacked
jurisdiction to consider the matter. The Department cannot create jurisdiction for a
reconsideration request by issuing an order holding it lacks jurisdiction to consider the
request.
Lastly, § 63-46b-13 (1997) prohibits reconsideration where agency review is
available and does not give the Department authority or discretion to operate in
contravention of that requirement. The Department's action in responding to Bourgeous'
request cannot independently endow jurisdiction where it is statutorily precluded.

POINT II: THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS LEGALLY
AND FACTUALLY INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
"The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his acts, representations, or
conduct, or by his silence when he ought to speak, induces another to believe certain facts
exist and such other relies thereon to his detriment." Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of
Utah. 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added), quoting Leaver v. Grose. 610
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P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980). It is not enough to simply rely upon the acts,
representations, conduct, or silence of another, but the reliance must result in detriment.
Holland v. Career Service Review Board. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993).
The "Notice of Right to Appeal" language included in the Department's December
29, 1997 order states that the order can be challenged by judicial review. From this
language, Bourgeous argues the Department is estopped from challenging the current
petition for judicial review as lacking jurisdiction. His analysis and argument, however,
neglect to consider three dispositive factors.
First, Bourgeous could not have relied to his detriment upon the order's Notice of
Right to Appeal language. The Department's October 24, 1997 Order on Review
dismissing his original request for agency review was the final agency action with respect
to his license denial. Bourgeous lost his opportunity to judicially challenge the order by
failing to file a petition for judicial review on or before November 23, 1997, the 30th day
following the issuance of the order.26 He cannot claim he forewent seeking judicial
review in reliance on an order that was not issued until December 29, 1997, more than

26

In its "Order of Dismissal," the District Court incorrectly identified the date of the
Department's Order on Agency Review as November 4,1997. The Order on Agency Review
was actually dated October 24, 1997. The November 4, 1997 order was based upon Bourgeous'
request to reopen Agency Review, an action not permitted by statute or rule. The thirty day
deadline to file for judicial review from October 24,1997, was November 23,1997. Despite the
apparent mistake on dates, it is clear that the District Court found that the Order on Agency
Review was the final agency action, triggering Bourgeous' 30 day period to seek judicial review.
Bourgeous' complaint for judicial review was well beyond either date.
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one month beyond the date his right to judicial review expired. Bourgeous did not rely to
his detriment.
Second, Bourgeous was fully advised in the Department's October 24, 1997 Order
on Review that any challenge to the order must be made to the district court within 30
days.27 He elected to disregard the order's appeal instructions by filing a request to
reopen agency review on October 30, 1997 and a request for agency reconsideration on
November 21, 1997. Neither request was permitted by statute or rule, and therefore
neither request operated to extend the time to file for judicial review.
Finally, the right to appeal language Bourgeous asserts he relied upon in the
Department's December 29 ,1997 order states that "[judicial review of this Order may be
obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the District Court within 30 days after the
issuance of this Order on Review." (Emphasis added). (See Bourgeous' Complaint,
Addendum u 8"). The Department's December 29th order did not address the merits of the
license denial, it dismissed Bourgeous' request for reconsideration solely on the basis that
reconsideration was not permitted by law in his case and the Department lacked
jurisdiction to consider the matter. The complaint requesting judicial review singularly
challenged the merits of the license denial and did not challenge the Department's finding
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Bourgeous' request for reconsideration.

27

The Department's Order on Agency Review was not defective or deficient in any
manner. See note 13.
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Without citing authority, Bourgeous argues that the Department somehow had a
duty to notify him that Agency Reconsideration was improper in time for him to file a
timely judicial review. The Department fulfilled its duty to advise Bourgeous of his
appellate rights in the preceding two orders, which contained notices of his right to appeal
judicially within 30 days. Bourgeous chose to ignore those notices.

POINT III: EVEN IF AGENCY RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT EXPRESSLY
PRECLUDED, RESPONDENT'S REQUEST WAS UNTIMELY.
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 requires that a request for Agency Reconsideration be
made within 20 days "after the date that an order is issued for which review by the agency
or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable...." The November 21,
1997, request for reconsideration was only within 20 days of the November 4, 1997 order
responding to his novel request to reopen agency review, a request which was not
permitted by statute or rule. Assuming for purposes of argument Bourgeous' request for
reconsideration filed on November 21, 1997 was statutorily permitted in this case, it was
filed more than 20 days beyond the Department's October 24, 1997 order dismissing
Agency Review, which constituted final agency action.
It should be noted, however, that although the District Court found that the "order
on agency review" was the final agency action, Judge Nehring identified the date of that
order as November 4,1997. This appears to be a mistake, because it is clearly contrary to

24

the uncontested evidence that the order on agency review was entered October 24,1997.
The November 4, 1997 order was based upon Bourgeous' request to reopen Agency
Review, a request with no basis in law.
Whether or not Bourgeous9 November 21 request for Agency Reconsideration was
made within 20 days depends upon whether the November 4 or the October 24 order is
considered the final agency action. Judge Nehring correctly identified the "order on
agency review" as the final agency action, but he incorrectly identified the date of that
order as November 4, 1997. Under the reasoning of this court in Maverick Country
Stores,28 as previously quoted in this brief, the trial court should not give validity to the
November 4 order based upon Bourgeous' request to reopen Agency Review (for
"rereview") because there was no basis in law for his request. Bourgeous should not be
allowed to enlarge the jurisdictional time period for seeking judicial review of the license
denial by filing a string of untimely and/or unauthorized requests for administrative
review. Ring v. Industrial Commission. Second Fund, 744 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).29

28

860P.2d944at951,fn9.

29

Supra, note 14.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Department asks that the Court affirm the District
Court's dismissal of Bourgeous' complaint for judicial review.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J£j_ day of December, 1998.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

j£FF,REY C. H O N T
Assistant Attorney General
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Gateway Tower East, Suite 900
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ADDENDUM 1
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Michael O. Uavitt
c
**«»or
Douflas C. Borba
EMCUUV* Director
J. Craif Jackson. R. Ph.
Oi-mtwi Director

M Watts Building
160 East 300 Sooth. PO Box 146741
Salt Laka City. Utah 64114-6741
(801)530-6628 Fax (801)530-6511
Investigations Fax* (801) 530-6301
http^/www comm«rM.staie.ut.us^^d/cornmsrca/dopi/doo< 1.1
H#b#r

September 24, 1997

KEITH W BOURGEOUS
2761 S 3000 W
SYRACUSE UT 84075

Dear Mr. Bourgeous:
DENIAL OF LICENSE:
Your application for licensure as a Professional Engineer was reviewed and denied for the following:
1. Failure to document graduation from the required EAC/ABET accredited program in engineering.
QUESTIONS OR ASSISTANCE:
If you have questions or need assistance, call:
Karen McCall, (801) 530-6632
CHALLENGE AFTER DENIAL OF LICENSURE:
You may challenge the denial by requesting agency review. If you choose to file a request for agency
review, you must adhere to the attached procedures.
Sincerely,

Karen McCall, Board Secretary
FOR THE BUREAU MANAGER
enclosure

ADDENDUM 2

October 21,1997

Keith Wyatt Bourgeous
2761 So. 3000 W.
Syracuse, Utah 84075

Douglas C. Borba, Executive Director
Utah Department of Commerce
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701

Dear Sin
I would like to request an agency review of my recent denial for licensor as a Professional
Engineer.
In 19741 graduated from Weber State College with an Associates Degree of Applied Science in
Electronics. At that time I had also completed an equivalent to a departmental minor in
chemistry. It became necessary at this time for me to seek full time employment at Phillips
Petroleum continue my education pan time.
In 19801 submitted a degree plan to the Electronics Department at Weber State College for a
Bachelors of Science Degree in Electronics. During my studies it came to my attention that 1
could gain a Professional Engineering License by completing the proper classes and passing the
required examinations. Throughout the remainder of my education I was careful to select the
required classes to meet the State Engineering requirements.
Upon graduation in 19891 passed the FE Exam, and registered with the State Department of
Commerce as an engineer in training. Requirements for Professional Licensing were completion
of 6 years of supervised engineering work and passing the PE exam.
In June of 19911 was able to transfer to a job that provided at least 50% qualifying time.
In 1994 during a conversation with the Division of Professional Licencing I was informed they
had reduced the qualifying time to four years and had eliminated the licensure by experience only.
And no longer fully accepted the TAC /ABET engineering program. My understanding at this
time was that my registration as an engineer in training was acceptance of my educational
requirements. I have received no notification contrary to this and would refer to definition 58-22102 10 as a reason for this understanding.
It states; "Professional engineering intern" means a person who has completed the education
requirements to become a professional engineer, has passed the fundamentals of engineering

examination, and is engaged in obtaining tbe four years of qualifying experience for licensure
under the direct supervision of a licensed professional engineer.
1 also fed that a review of my college transcripts would indicate that I have credits that would
meet or exceed those covered by definition Rl 56-22-102-a-i; a bachdors or post graduate degree
in engineering or equivalent education as determined by the NCEES Foreign Engineering
Education Evaluation Program andfouryears of full time engineering experience under
supervision of one or more licensed engineers; or eight years of experience under supervision of
one or more licensed engineers; or eight years of full time engineering experience under
supervision of one or more licensed professional engineers;
During the summer of 1995 I was able to increase my quafifying time to 100% of time worked.
The &11 pf 19961 called the State Dept. of Commerce and asked if I could take the PE Exam.
After confirming my status as an EH [now called a Professional Engineering Intern ] the
necessary forms were sent to me. 1 passed the PE exam in spring of 1997 and submitted my
application for Licensure then received notice of denial of licensure due to the dropping of
TAC/ABET accredited programs in 1992. Although the TAC/ABET curriculum is accepted as
criteria to take the Fundamentals of Engineering Examination.
have completed the requirements originally outlined to me by tbe Dept of Commerce and in
principal meet the current requirements of a professional engineer.
I would appreciate an earnest review of this request
Sincerely,

Keith Wyatt Bourgeous

ADDENDUM 3

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF
KEITH WYATT BOURGEOUS

ORDER ON REVIEW
DOPL: Misc

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request for agency review filed
by Keith Wyatt Bourgeous (hereafter "Petitioner") from an order of the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing (hereafter "Division").

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12,
Utah Code Annotated, and Rule R151-46b-12 of the Utah Administrative Code.

ISSUES REVIEWED
1.

Whether the Petitioner hasfileda request for agency review upon which relief

may be granted.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner filed a request for agency review, apparently from the denial by the

Division of his application for licensure as an Engineer. Petitioner did not furnish a copy of the
denial letter appealed from, although he was instructed by letter and a copy of the rules that
perfection of a Request for Agency Review requires the furnishing of the order allegedly wrongly
entered.
2.

It is impossible from the request for agency review to determine whether the appeal

was timely filed or the reasons for the Division's determination to deny licensure to Petitioner.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Division's denial letter to Petitioner would have included a copy of the

Department of Commerce Administrative Procedures Act Rules, along with instructions as to the
minimal requirements which must be met in order to obtain agency review. Among other things
the rules provide, in UTAH ADMIN. R151-46b-12:
(3) Content of a Request for Agency Review and Submission of
the Record.
(a) The content of a request for agency review shall be in
accordance with Subsection 63-46b-12(l)(b). The request for
agency review shall include a copy of the order which is the
subject of the request.
(b) A party requesting agency review shall set forth any factual
or legal basis in support of that request, including adequate
supporting arguments and citation to appropriate legal authority
and to the relevant portions of the record developed during the
adjudicative proceeding.
(c) If a party challenges afindingof fact in the order subject to
review, the party must demonstrate, based on the entire record, that
thefindingis not supported by substantial evidence. A party
challenging a legal conclusion must support their argument with
citation to any relevant authority and also cite to those portions of
the record which are relevant to that issue
(f) Failure to comply with this rule may result in dismissal
of the request for agency review. (Emphasis added).
2.

Petitioner failed to comply with the requirement that he furnish the Executive

Director with a copy of the order which is being challenged. Without being supplied such basic
information as the decision and reason that the Division determined that Petitioner was not

qualified to be licensed to act as an Engineer in the State of Utah, the Executive Director is
unable to conduct a proper review of the agency's action in denying licensure.
3.

The letter of instruction accompanying Petitioner's denial instructed him that

"You MUST include with your request a copy of the letter or order you wish reviewed".
Petitioner chose not to furnish the Executive Director with the information necessary to conduct
a review of the appeal so it is therefore necessary that the appeal be dismissed.

ORDER
The Executive Director of the Department of Commerce having made the above Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is, therefore
ORDERED that the Request for Agency Review heretofore filed by Keith Wyatt
Bourgeous is not well taken and the request should be and is hereby dismissed for failure to
comply with the rules governing agency review.
SO ORDERED this tha^jjf^day of October, 1997.

I iG-^U
DOUGLAS t. BORBA, Executive Director
y tah Department of Commerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the
District Coun within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15, Utah Code
Annotated.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on t h s s / y ^ day of October, 1997,1 caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, by certified mail to:
Keith Wyatt Bourgeous
2761 S. 3000 West
Syracuse UT 84075
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:
Craig Jackson, Director
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

MICHAEL R. MEDLEY, Department Counsel
Utah Department of Commerce

ADDENDUM 4

October 28, 1997

Dear Mr. Borba,
Please find enclosed a copy of my request of agency review. If these items were not
included in the original request it was an oversight on my part during the mailing or copying
procedure. I did not knowingly choose to withhold this information. I would ask that you would
please consider this request its merits. I have included a copy of your original review and have
included a travel agenda to show that I did not receive notification of the original denial of license
until Friday, October 3,1997.
I appreciate your assistance to this point. Thank your for your time and effort.

Sincerely,

Keith W. Bourgeous

ADDENDUM 5

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE AGENCY
REVIEW OF
KEITH WVATT BOURGEOUS

ORDER
DOPL: Misc

THIS MATTER COMES ON upon the request heretofore filed by Petitioner for further
consideration of his request for agency review upon which an order was heretofore entered on
October 24,1997 rejecting the appeal for failure to comply with the rules. In support of his
request Petitioner states that omission of a copy of the order appealed from had been an oversight
in the copying and mailing process.
The order denying Petitioner licensure, issued by the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, stated as the reason that Petitioner had not documented graduation from
an EAC/ABET accredited engineering program as required by the licensing statute.
Petitioner does oot attempt to establish in his request for review that he possesses the
statutorily required education, but instead documents a TAC/ABET accredited education which
ceased being acceptable for licensure on July 1,1996. The amendment establishing the increased
educational requirements was put into law in 1992, four years prior to its effective date, to
provide time for persons such as Petitioner possessing a lesser requirement to become licensed
prior to the effective date of the change. Petitioner's recourse, if any, lies with the legislature
rather than the administrative division which can only implement the legislative mandates under
which Petitioner does not qualify for licensure.
The Executive Director is of the opinion and finds that Petitioner's has stated no grounds

sufficient to support his request to reopen consideration of his appeal and the same should be
denied. It is, therefore
ORDERED that the request to reopen the Order on Review heretofore entered herein
should be and is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED this the

of November, 1997.

L£L

DOUGL/AfcitX BORBA, Exe^ive Director
Utah Department of Comma1

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the
District Court within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition for Review must
comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15, Utah Code Annotated.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on ikit/Y^

day of November, 1997,1 caused to be mailed a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, by certified
mail to:
Keith Wyatt Bourgeous
2761 S. 3000 West
Syracuse UT 84075

MICHAEL R. MEDLEY, Department Counse
Utah Department of Commerce
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November 21, 1997

ARIZONA SAW
MISSOURI SAP*
CALIFORNIA SAM
OHIO BAM

(801) 530-7422
cassbutler@cnmlaw.com

Douglas C. Borba, Executive Director
Utah Department of Commerce
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Box 146701
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701
Re:

o r COUNSEL

RICHARD H NCBEKCR
EARL P STATEN
JEFFREY N CLAYTON
LUCY KNIGHT ANDRE

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

VIA HAND DELIVERY

Keith W. Bourgeous

Dear Director Borba:
Enclosed are the following documents:
Request for Agency Reconsideration of an Order issued November
1.
4, 1997,
2.
Memorandum of Points & Authorities in support of Request for
Agency Reconsideration;
3.

Request for Record;

4.
Order dated November 4. 1997. received by Petitioner Keith W.
Bourgeous, constituting the Order from which this Request for Agency
Reconsideration is being submitted; and
5.

Request for Oral Argument.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

-r&^

Sincerely,

CASS BUTLER
CCB:j bm
cc:
Keith W. Bourgeous

ADDENDUM 7

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST
FOR AGENCY RECONSIDERATION BY
KEITH W. BOURGEOUS

ORDER ON REVIEW
Case No. DOPL Misc.

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request of the Petitioner, Keith
W. Bourgeous (hereafter "Petitioner"), by and through counsel, for agency reconsideration of the
denial of his application to be licensed as a professional engineer in the State of Utah by the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing (hereafter "Division") and the upholding of
such denial by the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce (hereafter "Department").

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Agency review of a Division's decision from which agency review is permitted is
conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code Annotated, and Rule Rl 51-46b-12 of the
Utah Administrative Code. Agency reconsideration of an order for which agency review is
unavailable is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code Annotated, and Rule R15146b-13 of the Utah Administrative Code.
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ISSUES REVIEWED
1.

Whether Petitioner is entitled to agency reconsideration.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On September 24,1997 the Division issued a denial letter to Petitioner advising

him that his application for licensure as a Professional Engineer had been denied because of
Petitioner's failure to document that he had graduated from an EAC/ABET accredited program in
engineering. Along with the denial letter the Petitioner was furnished with a letter advising him
of the minimal requirements necessary to obtain agency review along with a copy of the
applicable Department rules governing agency review.
2.

On October 23,1997 Petitioner filed a request for agency review but failed to

follow the Department rules by filing a copy of the order for which review was sought.
3.

On October 24, 1997 the Department issued an Order on Review dismissing

Petitioner's appeal for failure to comply with the rules governing agency review.
4.

On October 30, 1997 the Petitioner filed a request for reconsideration of the

Department's dismissal of his appeal which included a copy of the Division's order denying him
licensure. Petitioner alleged that the failure to include the Division's order had been mere
oversight on his part and excusable neglect in the copying and mailing process.
5.

On November 4, 1997 the Department issued an Order denying the request to

reopen the Order on Review as Petitioner stated no grounds upon which relief could be granted.
The Order cited that the basis for the Division's denial was Petitioner's failure to document
graduation from an EAC/ABET accredited engineering program and that Petitioner only
established the possession of a TAC/ABET which failed to meet the requirements put into law in
1992 to become effective July 1, 1996.

2

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§63-46b-12( 1 )(a) states that:

If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any
adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or
by a superior agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request
for review within 30 days after the issuance of the order with the
person or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule.
2.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§63-46b-13(1 )(a) provides that:

Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for
which review by the agency or by a superior agency under
Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would
otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a
written request for reconsideration with the agency, stating the
specific grounds upon which relief is requested. (Emphasis added).
3.

UTAH ADMIN. R151-46b-12(l)

states that:

An aggrieved party may obtain agency review of a final
order by filing a request with the executive director or the
department within thirty days following the issuance of the order.
4.

Utah Admin. Rl 51 -46b-13 provides for reconsideration only to the Real Estate

Appraiser Registration and Certification Board from orders issued by that board. No other
reconsideration is authorized by such rule.
5.

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act is .clear that reconsideration is available

only if agency review is unavailable to the aggrieved party from the adverse agency action for
which review is sought. The Department rules are equally clear that agency review by the
Executive Director is available from all agency actions taken by the Department's inferior
agencies and the boards and commissions thereunder with the sole exception of the Real Estate
Appraiser Registration and Certification Board.
5.

The Order on Review issued by the Department on October 24,1997 contained

the following:
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the
District Court within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petitioner for
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15, Utah Code
Annotated.
6.

The Order issued by the Department on November 4,1997 in response to

Petitioner's subsequent filing contained the following notice:

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the
District Court within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petitioner for
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15, Utah Code
Annotated.
7.

Agency review is available at the Department level from all actions taken by

divisions under the Department or any of the boards and commissions operating under the
auspices of the various divisions, with the sole exception of a single board under the Real Estate
Division of the Department for which reconsideration exists as the sole appeal available within
the Department before administrative remedies are exhausted and the aggrieved party becomes
eligible for judicial review. Therefore, agency reconsideration does not exist from the Orders
issued by the Executive Director and Petitioner's and Petitioner's recourse, as he was informed
on two occasions, was to appeal the Department's order to the District Court.
8.

A final order was previously entered by the Executive Director on the issues

raised by Petitioner herein and this matter no longer resides within the jurisdiction of the
Department. "When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to
dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1989).
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ORDER
The Executive Director of the Department of Commerce having made the above Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore
ORDERED that the Request for Agency Reconsideration heretofore filed by Keith W.
Bourgeous should be and is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED this th

of December, 1997.

LL

DOUGLAS C^ORBA, Execupy* Director
Utah Department of Commerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the
District Court within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for Review
must comply with Jhe requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-15, Utah Code Annotated.

5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the^C^tday of December, 1997, the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review by certified mail, properly addressed, postage
prepaid, to:
Cass C. Butler, Esq.
Callister, Nebeker & McCullough
Attorneys at Law
10 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City UT 84133

ATTORNEYS FOR KEITH W. BOURGEOUS
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:
J. Craig Jackson, Director
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
160 East 300 South, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MtfCtfftEL R. MEDLEY, Department Counsel
Utah Department of Commerce
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ADDENDUM 8

CASS C. BUTLER (4202)
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Gateway Tower East
10 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Keith W. Bourgeous
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

KEITH W. BOURGEOUS,

)

Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

)

VS •

)

)
)
)
)

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Defendant.

Civil No- 98-0900810
Judge Pat B. Brian

* * * * * * *

Plaintiff Keith W. Bourgeous, by way of Complaint, alleges and
complains of Defendant the Utah Department of Commerce, for cause of
action, as follows:

MATURE pf Tffg CASE
1*

This is an action seeking judicial review of an

informal adjudicative proceeding pursuant to U.C.A. 53-46b-15(l)(a).
Plaintiff Bourgeous seeks review of Defendant's Final Agency Decision
dated December 29, 1997, denying him a license as a Professional
Engineer in the State of Utah.

THE PARTIES
2.

Plaintiff Keith W. Bourgeous is a resident of the State

of Utah with his mailing and primary place of residence at 2761 South
3000 West, Syracuse, Utah 84 075.
3.

Defendant the Utah Department of Commerce is a Utah

Agency located at 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah-

Within

the Utah Department of Commerce is the Division of Occupational and
Processional Licensing ("DOPL").

U.C.A. § 58-1-103.

DOPL administers

and enforces all licensing laws of Title 58, including U.C.A. § 58-22,
regarding engineers and their licenses.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's

Complaint and review by trial de novo all final agency actions
resulting from the informal adjudicative proceedings against Plaintiff
pursuant to U.C.A. §§ 63-46b-15 and 78-3-4 (7).
5.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-

13-7.
Legislative Background
6.

The current version of the Professional Engineers and

Professional Land Surveyors Licensing Act, as revised,

(U.C.A. §58-

22), became effective July 1, 1996, when Governor Leavitt signed into
force Senate Bill SB-0235, which amended the 1994 version of the Act.
One of the stated purposes of the licensing amendments to the 1994
version was to correct certain sunset provisions in the prior law.
- 2 -

7.

Under the prior law fU.C.A. § 58-22-302 (1994)), an

applicant qualified for professional engineering license provided he
or she met one or more of the following:

(1) Four years experience,

(2) an engineering degree from p program accredited by the Technology
Accreditation Commission/Accreditation Board for Engineering and
Technology ("TAC/ABET,f) plus 2 years experience, or (3) a degree from
an Engineering Accreditation Commission/Accreditation Board for
Engineering Technology ("EAC/ABET") curriculum.

In addition, the

applicant was to have passed the Fundamentals in Engineering
Examination, the Principals and Practices Examination, the Utah Law
and Rules Examination, and obtain an additional 4 years of qualifying
experience under the supervisor of a licensed engineer.
8.

The 1994 law also provided that after July 1, 1996, the

education requirement could be completed by an EAC/ABET curriculum "or
equivalent curriculum" approved by the Division in cooperation with
the Board.

However, this part of the 1994 version never became

effective due to the amendments of 1996 in Senate Bill SB-0235.
9.

The amendments were proposed on January 12, 1996, by

Senator Craig Petersen.

After 6 drafts and other revisions, the bill

was presented to the Senate Business, Labor and Economic Standing
Committee.

The Standing Committee passed the Bill out favorably on

February 16, 1996.

Senate Bill SB-235 proposed a number of amendments

to the Engineering Licensing Law, including the admission criteria for
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taking the Fundamentals of Engineering Examination, which criteria was
not previously codified.
10.

As a prerequisite to taking the Fundamentals

Examination, the Amendment required enrollment in or graduation from
an EAC/ABET or TAC/ABET curriculum (or such other curriculum as may be
established by the Division in cooperation with the Board) . This
statutory acceptance of either an EAC/ABET or TAC/ABET curriculum
remained consistent throughout all of the bill's subsequent drafts,
despite the Committee's modifications to such things as whether or not
Utah would grant reciprocity to out of state engineers, whether an
applicant would have to establish good moral character, etc.
11.

The final version of SB-2035 which passed the Committee

and was signed into law by the Governor, provided that the education
requirement for a professional engineering license would be: "an
earned Bachelors or Masters Degree from an engineering program meeting
criteria established by Rule by the Division in collaboration with the
Board".

U.C.A. §58-22-302(d).

The final version also included the

EAC/ABET or TAC/ABET accreditation curriculum.
12.

Over two months after the new Amendments (effective

September 17, 1996), the Department of Commerce and DOPL promulgated
R156-22, "Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors
Licensing Act Rules."

The new regulation did not recognize TAC/ABET

degrees or other degrees meeting criteria established by the "Division
in Collaboration with the Board."
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13.

In addition, the new regulation R156-22-202 (2), 1996)#

sought to protect those who were "unsuccessful in obtaining licensure
by experience before July 1, 1996" by not requiring such applicants to
repeat their pre-July 1, 1994 supervised experience once they had
obtained an EAC/ABET degree.
STATEMENT OF ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF
14.

Pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-15(2)(a)(viii), Plaintiff

Bourgeous is entitled to relief because (a) his application for a
professional engineer license should have been evaluated by defendant
under the pre-July 1, 1996 requirements which recognized TAC/ABET
accredited engineering degrees inasmuch as Plaintiff received his
engineer-in-training certificate and commenced his qualifying
experience before the July 1, 1996 change; (b) Defendant and DOPL have
treated Plaintiff unfairly and differently than other professional
engineer applicants; and (c) Defendant and DOPL's denial of
Plaintiff's application and Rule R156-22-201 are based upon an
erroneous interpretation of U.C.A § 58-22-302 and 306 (1996), which
require the acceptance of a TAC/ABET accredited engineering degree.
FIRST CAUSE OP ACTION
(Violation of TT.C.A. S 63-46b-14 (4) (d))
15•

On June 9, 1989, Plaintiff Bourgeous received a

Bachelors of Science in Electrical Engineering Technology from Weber
State University.

Plaintiff Bourgeous's Engineering Degree was in an

accredited program recognized by TAC/ABET.
- 5 -

16.

Later that year Plaintiff applied with DOPL to take the

Fundamentals in Engineering Examination ("FEf!) offered by the National
Assessment Institute.

On October 29, 1989, Plaintiff Bourgeous

received a>passing score on the FE exam.
17.

Plaintiff Bourgeous also applied in 1989 with the Utah

Department of Commerce and was given an Engineer-in-Training
Certificate.

The Certificate No. 9451-0999-0 was issued pursuant to

the then applicable Department of Commerce Regulation R153-22-2(c)
which stated that the Certificate was valid for 10 years without
renewal.
18.

After receiving the Engineer-in-Training Certificate,

Plaintiff Bourgeous commenced working on the requirement of qualifying
experience under the supervision of a licensed engineer.

In June of

1991, Plaintiff Bourgeous accepted a new job which provided only 50%
of qualifying time towards the then 6 years required for licensure
under P.C.A. § 58-22-5 (1990).
19.

Plaintiff Bourgeous continued working on his qualifying

time and completed the necessary years of experience in 1997 (2 years
before his Engineer-in-Training Certificate No. 9451-0999-0 would have
expired), whereupon he applied to take the NCEES Principles and
Practices Engineering Examination.
20.

On April 18, 1997, Plaintiff Bourgeous received a

passing score on the Principles and Practices Engineering Exam.
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Plaintiff Bourgeous' application for license was received by DOPL on
September 2, 1997.
21.

By letter dated September 24, 1997# DOPL denied

Plaintiff Bourgeous' application for "failure to document graduation
from the required EAC/ABET accredited program in engineering.11
Plaintiff Bourgeous subsequently sought Agency Review on October 21,
1997.
22.

On October 24, 1997, Defendant the Utah Department of

Commerce dismissed Plaintiff Bourgeous' request on the grounds for
"failure to comply with the rules governing agency review."

Upon

further consideration, the Agency denied on November 4, 1997, a
request "to reopen the Order".
23.

Plaintiff Bourgeous subsequently requested agency

reconsideration of the denial and on December 29, 1997, Defendant
denied and dismissed the request, which denial exhausted Plaintiff's
administrative remedies.

A copy of the December 19, 1997 Denial is

attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and is incorporated by reference.
24.

Under the Department's regulation applicable in 1989

(R153-22-2), Plaintiff Bourgeous met the educational requirements for
an Engineer-in-Training certification.

At that time a degree in

Engineering Technology was not considered to be an engineering degree
for purposes of the Certificate and DOPL required that the applicant
complete 2 years of engineering experience prior to application to
take the Engineer-in-Training examination.
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However, degrees in

engineering at a Utah College or University including chemical
engineering, civil engineering, electrical engineering, etc., were
recognized as fulfillment of the educational requirements.

(See R153-

22-2(a) (1) (a) (1989)). Plaintiff Bourgeous met the educational
requirements because he had earned an electrical engineering degree.
25.

The then applicable regulation also provided than an

Engineer-in-Training Certificate was not subject to renewal and was
valid for 10 years from the date the examination was passed (R153-222(c) (1989)) .
26.

Once awarded the Engineer-in-Training Certificate,

Plaintiff Bourgeous was deemed to have completed the then applicable
educational requirements for licensure and only needed to complete his
work experience and pass the PE examination.
27.

By failing to recognize Plaintiff Bourgeous' completion

of the educational requirements for licensure as met by the Engineerin-Training Certificate, the Department has acted improperly and has
effectively eviscerated Plaintiff Bourgeous' 10 year Engineer-inTraining Certificate previously awarded to him by DOPL.
28.

The Defendant and DOPL's denial of Plaintiff Bourgeous'

application for professional licensure was improper and violated the
Standards under U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(d> and therefore should be
reversed.
29.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands relief as is

more fully set forth in his prayer for relief.
- 8-

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of TJ.C.A. 5 63-46b-16 (4) (h) (iii))
30.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all

of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 29 of this Complaint.
31.

Defendant and DOPL denied licensure to Plaintiff

Bourgeous because they treated his application as not being filed
prior to July 1, 1996.

Yet, in the case of John P. Hunter, the

Department took a different position.
32.

Mr. Hunter did not have a EAC/ABET degree either and

also made final application after July 1, 1996. Yet, the Department
treated Mr. Hunter's earlier application (presumably his application
for the FE exam and to be an intern), as the applicable application
for commencing the licensure process.

In so doing, the Defendant

stated,
The problem in this case was that your client [Mr.
Hunter] filed a new application rather than
amending his old one. When he filed the appealed
application he did not qualify under the law now
in effect.
33.

The Department went on to reason in Mr. Hunter's case

that he should have been considered under the old law which permitted
TAC/ABET degrees because his "initial application" was before July 1,
1996.

Like Mr. Hunter, Plaintiff Bourgeous's initial application was

before July 1, 1996, yet the Department has treated Plaintiff
Bourgeous differently than Mr. Hunter.
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engineering at a Utah College or University including chemical
engineering, civil engineering, electrical engineering, etc., were
recognized as fulfillment of the educational requirements.

(See R153-

22-2(a) (1) (a) (1989)). Plaintiff Bourgeous met the educational
requirements because he had earned an electrical engineering degree.
25.

The then applicable regulation also provided than an

Engineer-in-Training Certificate was not subject to renewal and was
valid for 10 years from the date the examination was passed (R153-222(c) (1989)) .
26.

Once awarded the Engineer-in-Training Certificate,

Plaintiff Bourgeous was deemed to have completed the then applicable
educational requirements for licensure and only needed to complete his
work experience and pass the PE examination.
27.

By failing to recognize Plaintiff Bourgeous' completion

of the educational requirements for licensure as met by the Engineerin-Training Certificate, the Department has acted improperly and has
effectively eviscerated Plaintiff Bourgeous' 10 year Engineer-inTraining Certificate previously awarded to him by DOPL.
28.

The Defendant and DOPL's denial of Plaintiff Bourgeous'

application for professional licensure was improper and violated the
Standards under U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) and therefore should be
reversed.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands relief as is more
fully set forth in his prayer for relief.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of P.C.A. S 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii))
29.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all

of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 28 of this Complaint.
30.

Defendant and DOPL denied licensure to Plaintiff

Bourgeous because they treated his application as not being filed
prior to July 1, 1996.

Yet, in the case of John P. Hunter, the

Department took a different position.
31.

Mr. Hunter did not have a EAC/ABET degree either and

also made final application after July 1, 1996.

Yet, the Department

treated Mr. Hunter's earlier application (presumably his application
for the FE exam and to be an intern), as the applicable application
for commencing the licensure process.

In so doing, the Defendant

stated,
The problem in this case was that your client [Mr.
Hunter] filed a new application rather than
amending his old one. When he filed the appealed
application he did not qualify under the law now
in effect.
32.

The Department went on to reason in Mr. Hunter's case

that he should have been considered under*the old law which permitted
TAC/ABET degrees because his "initial application" was before July 1,
1996.

Like Mr. Hunter, Plaintiff Bourgeous's initial application was

before July 1, 1996, yet the Department has treated Plaintiff
Bourgeous differently than Mr. Hunter.
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WHEREFORE, the Defendant has violated U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(iii)
by acting in a manner contrary to prior practices, and Plaintiff
Bourgeous demands relief as is more fully set forth in his prayer for
relief.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of U.C.A. S 63-46b-16(4)(a) and (b))
33.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all

of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 32 of this Complaint.
34.

Under U.C.A. §58-22-302 the EAC/ABET and TAC/ABET

curriculums are treated equally for purposes of taking the
Fundamentals of Engineering Examination.

The State Legislature made

no distinction between the two curriculums.

Furthermore, at no place

in the Statute did the State Legislature state that a TAC/ABET
curriculum would be unacceptable in meeting the education requirements
for licensure.
35.

By recognizing the TAC/ABET curriculum as acceptable

and on equal footing with an EAC/ABET curriculum for purposes of
taking the Professional Engineering Examination, the State Legislature
has implicitly required the Department of Commerce and DOPL to
recognize such a curriculum as well, consistently throughout all
requirements for licensure.
WHEREFORE, Rule 156-22-201 which recognizes only an EAC/ABET
engineering program and not also a TAC/ABET engineering program is in
direct violation and contradiction of the Statute and Plaintiff
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Bourgeous demands relief as is more fully set forth in his prayer for
relief.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of U.CA. § 63-46b-16(4) (g) >
36.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all

of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 35 of this Complaint.
37.

Defendant's actions are based upon a determination of

facts which are not supported by substantial evidence in violation of
U.C.A. § 63-46b-16U) (g).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands relief as is more fully
set forth in his prayer for relief.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of U.C.A. S 63-46b-16(4) (h) (i))
38.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all

of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 37 of this Complaint.
39.

Defendant's actions abuse the discretion delegated to

Defendant by Statute and are in violation of U.C.A^ § 63-46b16(4) (h) (i) •
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands relief as is more fully
set forth in his prayer for relief.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Arbitrary and Capricious)
40.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all

of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Complaint.
- 11 -

Defendant's actions are arbitrary and capricious, in
violation of U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands relief as is more fully
set forth in his prayer for relief.

PLAYER

roy rogy

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bourgeous demands judgment in his favor and
against Defendant the Utah Department of Commerce as follows:
1.

That pursuant to the First Cause of Action, this Court

enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant by Ordering
Defendant to grant Plaintiff a license for Professional Engineer in
the State of Utah, and entering judgment against Defendant in an
amount to be determined at trial, together with all costs, plus a
reasonable attorney's fee.
2.

That pursuant to the Second Cause of Action, this Court

enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant by Ordering
Defendant to grant Plaintiff a license for Professional Engineer in
the State of Utah, and entering judgment against Defendant in an
amount to be determined at trial, together with all costs, plus a
reasonable attorney's fee.
3.

That pursuant to the Third Cause of Action, this Court

enter judgment against Defendant by Striking as unconstitutional and
contrary to Statute Defendant's Regulation R156-22, and entering
judgment against Defendant in an amount to be determined at trial,
together with all costs, plus a reasonable attorney's fee.
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That pursuant to the Fourth Cause of Action, this Court

enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant by Ordering
Defendant to grant Plaintiff a license for Professional Engineer in
the State of Utah, and entering judgment against Defendant in an
amount to be determined at trial, together with all costs, plus a
reasonable attorney's fee.
5*

That pursuant to the Fifth Cause of Action, this Court

enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff arid against Defendant by Ordering
Defendant to grant Plaintiff a license for Professional Engineer in
the State of Utah, and entering judgment against Defendant in an
amount to be determined at trial, together with all costs, plus a
reasonable attorney's fee,
6.

That pursuant to the Sixth Cause of Action, this Court

enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant by Ordering
Defendant to grant Plaintiff a license for Professional Engineer in
the State of Utah, and entering judgment against Defendant in an
amount to be .determined at trial, together with all costs, plus a
reasonable attorneys ree.
Dated this / O ~"dav of January, 199*8.

Cat* %cr4<i

CASS C. BUTLER

CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Bourgeous

ADDRESS OF PLAINTIFF:
2761 South 3000 West
Syracuse, Utah 84075
J0M72-1

ADDENDUM 9

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third .indicia! District

MARTIN B. BUSHMAN (#5594)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Counsel for the Defendant
160 East 300 South
Box 140872
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872
Telephone: (801) 366-0310

JUL 2 2 \m
By.

SALT LAK&<50UNTY
tS
'

C*puty UerK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KEITH W. BOURGEOUS,
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
vs.

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, :
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 980900810
Judge Ronald E. Nehring

The above entitled matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff s Complaint requesting judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15( 1 )(a). The
Court having reviewed Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and all responsive memoranda thereto, and
having heard oral argument by both parties at hearing on June 5,1998, hereby finds and orders as
follows:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 2,1997, Plaintiff applied with the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing (Division) of the Department of Commerce (Department) for licensure as a professional
engineer. The license application was denied by the Division on September 24, 1997 for "failure
to document graduation from the required E A C / A B E T accredited program in engineering." On
October 21,1997, Plaintiff requested "agency review' with the Department under Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-12.
On October 24,1997, the Department issued its Order on Review denying Plaintiffs request
for relief. The Department's order advised Plaintiff he could seek judicial review of the order
through filing a petition for judicial review in the district court within 30 days of its issuance.
Plaintiff nevertheless elected to file a supplemental request with the Department on October 30,1997
requesting that agency review be reopened for consideration of additional information not included
in the original request. The Department issued an other order on November 4, 1997, denying
Plaintiffs request to reopen agency review. Although the Order advised Plaintiff of his right to seek
judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15, it did not offer "agency reconsideration" under
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 as an appeal option.
Plaintiff petitioned the Department on or about November 21, 1997 for agency
reconsideration challenging the November 4, 1997 Order on Review. The Department dismissed
the request for agency reconsideration on December 29, 1997 for lack of jurisdiction. On January

2

23, 1998, Plaintiff filed for judicial review in this Court challenging the merits of the Division's
September 24, 1997 decision to deny Plaintiffs license application.
DISCUSSION
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires that written orders on agency review
include, among other things, "a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or
judicial review available to aggrieved parties." (Emphasis added). Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b12(6)(c)(vii). The Order on Review entered by the Department on November 4, 1997 notified
Plaintiff of hisrightto seek judicial review byfilinga petition for review in the District Court within
30 days of the order as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 and § 63-46b-l 5. The order did not
impose any requirement or inform him of anyrightto seek agency reconsideration under Utah Code
Ann. 63-46b-13. From the November 4,1998 Order on Review, Plaintiff enjoyed a 30 day window
within which to seek judicial review. Rather than pursue judicial review within this time period,
Plaintiff elected to file with the Department a petition for agency reconsideration under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-13(l). However, agency reconsideration, as defined in § 63-46b-13, was not
available to Plaintiff as a means of administrative relief on account he had previously sought and
received agency review under § 63-46b-12. The language in § 63-46b-13(l)(a) explicitly states that
agency reconsideration is available as an administrative appellate option only in cases where agency
review under § 63-46b-12 is unavailable.
Plaintiffs election to seek agency reconsideration does not act to toll the 30 day period in
which he was required to file for judicial review in the district court since he had norightto seek
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reconsideration. Plaintiffs contention that the heading to § 63-46b-13 reading, "Agency reviewReconsideration," reflects the Legislature's intent to authorize reconsideration where agency review
is available is unpersuasive. The title of an act cannot be used "to create an ambiguity or uncertainty
when the language of the body of the act is clear." Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co..414
P.2d 963, 964-65 (Utah 1966). Because there existed no right to seek agency reconsideration,
Plaintiffs filing of his request for reconsideration does not toll the running of the 30 day filing
period for judicial review, nor does the Department's order denying Plaintiffs improper request for
reconsideration revive arightto seek judicial review or create a new right of review.
Lastly, Plaintiffs claim that the Department is estopped from challenging the untimeliness
of his request for judicial review on account of its December 29,1997 order which informed him he
could appeal the order through judicial review is unpersuasive. Plaintiff fails set out the facts which
satisfy the elements of an estoppel claim against a state agency. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to
establish he relied on the Department's Order to his detriment, Holland v. Career Service Review
Board. 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1993); and he fails to establish that the requested relief will not
substantially effect public policy in a adverse manner, and that injustice will result in the absence
of relief. Utah State University v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982).
Plaintiffs Complaint requesting judicial review was filed on January 23,1998, more than
30 days beyond the Department's Order on Review. Accordingly, the Complaint wasfileduntimely
and the Court is without jurisdiction to consider the matter.
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For the reasons and upon the grounds set forth above and in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
it is hereby:
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted and Plaintiffs request for judicial
review is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this J ^ d a y of ^(JuLu^

1998.

Cass C. Butler
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM 10

Ch. 161

Laws of Utah 1987

(vil) a notice of anyrighteTrgfThcr administrative
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the lime limits applicable to any appeal or
f f V1CW.

Section 269. SectftM Ended.
Section 63-466-13. Utah Code Annotated 1953,
it enacted to read:

63-466-15. Judicial review . informal
adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction
to review by trial de novo all final agency action
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings,
except that final agency action from informal adjudicative proceedings based on a record shall be
reviewed by the district courts on the record according to the standards of Subsection 63-46b-16

ill:

(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudi4V46k-13. Agency review • Reconsideration.
(1) Within ten days after the date that an order cative proceedings shall be as provided in the statute
on review is issued, or within ten days after the date governing the agency or, in the absence of such a
that a final order is issued for which agency review venue provision, in the county where the petitioner
Is unavailable, any party may file a written request resides or maintains his principal place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
for reconsideration, stating the specific grounds
upon which relief is requested. Unless otherwise adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint goveprovided by statute, the filing of the request is not a rned by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall
prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order include:
or the order on review.
(i) the name and mailing address of the party
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed seeking judicial review;
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail
(ii) the name and mailing address of the responto each party by the person making the request.
dent agency;
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to
for that purpose, shall issue a written order granting be reviewed, together with a duplicate copy,
the request or denying the request.
summary, or brief description of the agency action;
(b) If the agency head or the person designated
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20 "in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to
days after the filing of the request, the request for the agency action;
rehearing shall be considered to be denied.
fv) a copy of the written agency order from the
DfOI
informal
proceeding;
Section 270. Section Enacted.
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking
Section 63~46b~14, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
judicial review is entitled to obtain judicial review;
to read:
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and
63-46b-14. Jadidal review • fj&aastion of
extent of relief requested;
administratrvc i
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner
( D A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review is entitled to relief.
of final agency action except in actions where judT
(b) All additional pleading and proceedings in the
cia) review is expressly prohibited by statute, only district court are governed by the Utah Rules of
after exhausting all administrative remedies avail- Civil Procedure.
able, except that:
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall
(a) a party seeking judicial review peed pot determine all questions of fact and law and any
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
any other statute states that exhaustion is not requ(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial
ired; •
proceedings under this section.
(b) the court may relieve a parry seeking judicial
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all Section 272. Section Enacted.
administrative remedies if:
U- Section 63-466-16, Utah Code-Annotated 1953.
~-+r 4i) the administrative remedies"afe"feadequateroT
is enacted to read:
(ID cxnausrion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit 63-466-16, Jadidal review . Formal adjudicative
derivedfromrequiring exhaustion.
(1) The Supreme Court or other appellate court
C2) (a) A party shall fDe a petition for judicial
review of final agency anion within 30 days after designated by statute has jurisdiction to review all
the date that the order constituting the final agency final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
action is issued.
(1) (a) To seek judicial review «f final areng
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all
proceed;
other appropriate parties as respondents and shall action resulting from formal adj"^'^"yg
rtn fnT
review oj
meet the form requirements specified in this chapter. ings. the petitioner shall file a per«"
agency action in the form required bv the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
1271. Section Enacted.
ft) The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedug
Section 6M6V15, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
govern ail additional filings and proceedings mjng
is enacted to read:
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ADDENDUM 11

Laws of U t a h - 1
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for renew within [ten] 28 dayi after the issuance of the order with the person or entity designatad for that purpose by the statute or rule.
(fc) Tlie request shall:

Ch.72

Section 28. Section Amended.
Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 161, Laws of Utah 1987, is
amended to read:
68-46b-18. Agency review—Reconsider*
tion.

ftft)](i) be signed by the party eer ring renew;
ftbHCii) state the groundf for renew and the relief
requested;
[fe)](iiD state the date upon which it was mailed;
and
ftdttftx) be sent by mail to the presiding officer
and to each party.
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing dak of the rem i t for WVMW. ttr within fn# *m» period provided
bv ajgnev rale. w n i r W g r it )anf*r. any party mif

file a response with the person designated by statuts or ruk to rsoerfe the response. One copy of the
rerpoiJMsbjdlbesentbymsiltoee^ofthepeTtiee
and la the presiding officer.
(8) If s statute or the agsncys rules require re*
nsw of an order by the agency or a superior agency,
the agency or superior agency shall renew the order
within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the agency's rules.
(4) lb assist in renew, the agency or superior
afsncymsybycTO^crnilepeTTmtth^psrtieetofile
briefr or other papers, or to conduct oral argument
(6) Notice ofheartngion renew shall be mailed to
all parties.
16) (a) Within a rsaeonsMe time after thefilingof
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or
within the time required by statute or applicable
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a
written order on renew.
(b) Tlie order on renew shall be signed by the
agency head or by a person designated by the agency
far that purpose and shall be mailed to each party.
<e) The order on renew shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting
or requiring renew;
(ii) a statement of the issues renewed;

(l)(aj Within [tea days after the dote the* en er
der en review ie issued, ei» within tew] 2Q days after
the date that [s-finei] an order IM issued for which

[agency] review by the agency or by i wpcrior

Myenrv undff fi^rm 63-*6h-l2 ii unavailable,
and if th« nrder would otherwise cnnrtitiit*. final
ag»nrv action, anv party mav file a written reggaet

ibr reconsideration with thm agency, stating the specific groundf upon which relief is requested.
(hi) UnleM otherwuw provided by statute, the filing ofthe request ii not s prerequisiteforeeekingjudicial renew of the order [st she order en loviowl.
(2) Ths request for rsconsidsrstion shall be filed
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to
each party by the person making ths request
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated
for that purpose, shall issue a written order grants
ing ths request or denying the request
(b) Ifths agency heed or the person designated far
that purpose does not issue an order within 20 days
after thefilingof the request, the request for [rehearing] Bflonsidratioii shall be considered to be
denied.
Section 24. Section Amended.
tiection*3-46b-14, Utah Code AiinotateTtfti
as enacted by Chapter 161, Lews of Utah 1987, ii
amended to read:
«-46b-14. Judicial iwriew—Exhaustion of
administrative remedies,
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain Judicial revise
offinalagency action, except in actions where judi
dal review is sxprsssly prohibited by statutedL
fg) Apurtvmiv'WVfodfeieli»vfowonlyafterax
haustingall administrativs remedies available, ex
osptthat'
(a) a party peeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or
any other statute states that exhaustion is not required;

(nD findings of met as to each of the issues renewed;
(fcr) wmrhisione of law as to each of the issues re-

(b) the court may relieve a party leering judicial
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative rstnediee if:

neww

(T) the reasons liar the disposition;

(i) the admimstratrfs ramediee are inadequate;

to) whethartbs decision of the presiding officer
or agency is to be sffirmsd, reversed, or modified,
•nd whether all or any portion of the adjudicative
proserin if is to be remanded;

(ii) nrt* i"***"'" ^fj^fAimm —~*\A «—«!» <» «wp«.
rable harm disproportionate to ths public benefit
derivedfromrequiring sxhaustigj^

(•ii) a notice of anyrightof further administrative rseonsidsration or judicial renew available to
aggrieved parties; and

KMOXft) ApsrtyshslJn^spetitionfbrjudidsl
renew offinalagency action within 30 days after
the date that the order oonstjtutinf tfrafiral agency

(•Hi) the time limits applicable to any appeal or
renew.

»<*imiaiaanadOTiimmdfti^tftha™fr^f^i«d
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